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a master
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a t  w o r k :
John Heinz
was a demanding, data-driven, tenacious  
policymaker, distinguished by his compassion 
for aggrieved citizens and his effectiveness  
in achieving passage of legislation. The issues 
highlighted in this case study represent only  
a few of the many areas in which his work  
has had long-lasting public policy impact. 
Heinz’s considerable substantive policy  
contributions are not the only memorable 
aspect of his legacy, however. He was a personal 
inspiration to many who served under him and 
who have moved on to other influential roles 
in the last 20 years, and some believe that the 
reasoned, bipartisan legislative style in which 
he specialized is needed today more than ever.
heinz has a conversation with a voter during his campaign, 1976.
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
portrait of a successful senator
Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
saving social security (1981–83)
Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
who decides disability? (1981–84)
Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
finishing his mentor’s work:  
heinz and pension reform (1984–86)
Chapter 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
let them work:  
the end of mandatory retirement (1984–86)
Chapter 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
taking the gloves off:  
senator heinz’s health care investigations
Chapter 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
a catastrophe for congress:  
the catastrophic care bill (1987–89)
Chapter 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
the last investigation (1990–91)
Chapter 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
a lasting legacy
Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
1
contentsU N I V E R S I T Y  O F  P I T T S B U R G H
I n s t i t u t e  o f  P o l i t i c s
case study
h. john heinz iii  
and the u.s. senate  
special committee on aging
a master
legislator
a t  w o r k :
Like many successful people, John Heinz was full 
of contradictions. A Republican who chaired his 
party’s reelection committee in the Senate but who 
hired a lot of Democrats and Independents. The 
descendant of a very successful line of businessmen 
who instead devoted himself to public service. The 
list goes on.
What is clear from this account of his work on 
behalf of older Americans is that he used these 
contradictions to great effect. His desire to 
exceed expectations caused him to work harder 
than most of his colleagues and to inspire his 
staff to work toward the same standard. His 
willingness to reach across party lines was an 
effective strategy to find common ground and to 
achieve legislative results. His skill at using the 
media to challenge even the president—from his 
own party—and his persistence, even if it meant 
irritating his colleagues and friends, enabled him 
to break through barriers that thwarted other less 
determined elected officials.
Many things distinguish John Heinz from many of 
today’s members of the U.S. Senate, but the most 
important is that quality I saw in my first encounter 
with him. He cared about his constituents’ needs 
and interests, and that’s what drove his work, 
rather than a commitment to an abstract ideology 
about private enterprise or the role of government. 
He certainly understood politics and the need to 
I knew I liked John Heinz 
a minute or two into my 
first meeting with him, 
which was an interview 
for staff director of the 
U.S. Senate Special 
Committee on Aging he 
chaired. I didn’t expect 
to like him and seriously 
doubted I could ever work 
for him. I softened a bit 
as he made me feel immediately comfortable with 
that infectious smile and his famous charm and 
quick wit. And I suppose I was impressed by his 
intellect. But it was his forthrightness and his lack 
of guile and pretense that were most attractive. He 
cared about the issues, not about the politics or his 
image. About 20 minutes into the interview, as I 
warmed to the idea of actually working for him, 
but still having serious doubts, I blurted out, “I can 
do your aging committee work, but I’m not doing 
any of your political bidding. The fact that you’re a 
Republican is your problem.” After that outburst, 
I figured the interview would probably come to an 
abrupt end. Instead, he smiled and said, “That’s fine 
with me. When can you start?”
Foreword
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was affordable and didn’t push people into the “no 
care zone” all derived from a belief that the system 
should be fair and that society had a responsibility 
to ensure the health and economic security of its 
most vulnerable citizens. 
I often wonder what the world would be like if 
John Heinz were still alive and involved in politics. 
Might he have become a candidate for president 
someday? I actually asked him that question a few 
years before his death. He said, “I would consider 
running for president when I look around and 
none of the other potential candidates seems as 
good as I am.” He then flashed a wry smile and 
said, “And I’m getting close to that point now.”
As I look around, I don’t see many public servants 
who are as “good” as John Heinz. He left a huge 
legacy of accomplishment and a large group of 
former staff members, volunteers, constituents, and 
friends who are devoted to carrying on his legacy. We 
miss him, but his work lives on in enduring public 
policies and in the lives of those who were privileged 
to be able to know him—contradictions and all.
Stephen McConnell
The Atlantic Philanthropies
be a member of a political party. But, as chair of 
the Senate Special Committee on Aging, he was 
all about the needs of his constituents, who were 
not only the elderly of the time but also future 
generations who would become old someday, those 
who today have parents and grandparents in need 
of help, and vulnerable individuals and families who 
deserve to be treated fairly. 
Today, John Heinz would have trouble finding a 
comfortable place in either political party and would 
surely be frustrated by the reluctance in Congress 
to find common ground. The fact that compromise 
has become a four-letter word would surely frustrate 
John Heinz, who always defied easy labels as a 
conservative or liberal. He cared about getting things 
done, and even as a member of the majority party, 
he knew you still had to work across the aisle and to 
consider the other side’s views and concerns if you 
wanted to find solutions to problems. 
But John Heinz wasn’t just a deal maker, a 
moderate in search of any solution. He was driven 
by a deeply held value proposition that while he 
was born to wealth and privilege, many Americans 
did not enjoy the same advantage, and they needed 
their public servants to ensure they got a fair shake. 
His work to protect social security and private 
pensions, his efforts to eliminate the last vestiges of 
institutionalized ageism in employment practices, 
and his commitment to a health care system that 
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There would have been no story to tell without 
the kind and enthusiastic participation of seven 
former Heinz staff members who graciously 
shared their recollections in personal interviews: 
Larry Atkins, Jeff Lewis, Frank McArdle, 
Stephen McConnell, Jim Michie, John Rother, 
and Cliff Shannon. Michie, Atkins, McConnell, 
and Rother also permitted us to draw from their 
previously unpublished written recollections, which 
were invaluable in providing accurate, detailed 
reconstructions of events now a quarter-century old.
This production was a team effort. Morton “Moe” 
Coleman, director emeritus of the Institute of 
Politics, and Kathy McCauley conceived the 
project, performed background and archival 
research, identified the issues to be covered, 
and conducted the first three interviews. Bruce 
Barron did additional research and interviewing 
and composed most of the first draft, drawing 
from unpublished material written by Rother, 
McConnell, and Atkins for Chapter 1 and by 
Michie for Chapter 5.
Finally, we owe considerable thanks to Patricia 
Hameister, chief clerk of the U.S. Senate Special 
Committee on Aging, for providing, in impeccably 
organized fashion, the committee’s published 
materials and every original source document she 
could track down.
This is the second 
University of Pittsburgh 
Institute of Politics 
case study highlighting 
significant achievements 
by the late U.S. Senator 
H. John Heinz III 
(R-Pennsylvania). It 
follows Crossing the 
Aisle to Cleaner Air, 
which examined the 
role of “Project 88,” an 
environmental policy initiative of Heinz and fellow 
Senator Tim Wirth (D-Colorado) that introduced 
widespread use of market-based incentives in U.S. 
environmental policy.
For both publications, the Institute is deeply 
indebted to the financial support and strategic 
guidance provided by the Heinz Endowments. In 
addition, the Senator H. John Heinz III Archives 
at Carnegie Mellon University assisted by making 
available dozens of relevant primary source 
documents.
Acknowledgments
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The Heinz Endowments exercised no editorial 
control over the project; in fact, Endowments 
staff who reviewed early drafts expressed concern 
that the narrative might sound too flattering. 
But beyond noting his sometimes demanding 
nature, nobody had anything negative to say 
about John Heinz’s character. People may agree 
or disagree with his policy positions, but his 
diligence, unyielding determination, respectfulness, 
unselfishness, and creativity in carrying out his 
responsibilities as a U.S. Senator provide a model 
worth learning from. Thus, the purpose of this case 
study: to give a behind-the-scenes glimpse of  
John Heinz, a master legislator at work.
senator John heinz speaks to greenway school students on the steps of the capitol, washington, d.c., 1978.
heinz greets the newly elected president of the united states, ronald reagan, in 1980.
But aging issues coincided well with both Heinz’s 
personal and political interests. He had first 
entered this domain as a marketing executive 
with the H.J. Heinz Company, where he had 
been involved in creating a line of specialty 
food products aimed at seniors. While in the 
U.S. House of Representatives, he had worked 
with several other members to create its Select 
Committee on Aging. Politically, as he would be 
seeking reelection in 1982 in a state with a large 
elderly population, he certainly saw the value of 
being a national leader on issues like protecting 
social security and opposing mandatory retirement. 
Beyond that, he perceived an opportunity to 
combine the Aging Committee chairmanship 
with his seat on the influential U.S. Senate 
Committee on Finance to advance his legislative 
agenda. Virtually every major issue affecting 
seniors had something to do with social security, 
Medicaid, Medicare, and/or the Internal Revenue 
Code—all of which were issues within the Finance 
Committee’s purview. Thus Heinz could use the 
bully pulpit of the Aging Committee to raise 
visibility of issues and then move his legislative 
remedies forward through Finance.
Members of Heinz’s staff indicated that Heinz 
wanted this chairmanship enough that he engaged 
in intense behind-the-scenes negotiations to 
outmaneuver Kansas Senator Nancy Kassebaum 
for the assignment. For the next six years, he 
portrait of 
a successful senator
The 1980 elections, in which Ronald Reagan 
defeated Jimmy Carter for the presidency, also 
gave Republicans control of the U.S. Senate and its 
committees for the first time since 1954. Among 
the many previously inaccessible opportunities 
that thus became available to Republican senators, 
Pennsylvania’s John Heinz focused on one that 
might have seemed incongruous for a 42-year-
old: the chairmanship of the U.S. Senate Special 
Committee on Aging.
Though already chairman of the Republican 
Senatorial Campaign Committee (and thereby 
entitled to a good share of the credit for his party’s 
electoral success), Heinz, according to the Senate’s 
traditional seniority system, was not yet in line for a 
chairmanship. Moreover, the Special Committee on 
Aging is not usually a coveted assignment because 
it has no legislative authority; it has a staff and can 
hold hearings and issue reports, but it cannot move 
legislation onto the Senate floor.
Chapter 1
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BIPARTISAN
Aided by his largely centrist policy stances, Heinz 
was an effective bipartisan figure in the Senate, 
even during the contentious early Reagan years. 
Upon taking over the Aging Committee, he 
offered a fair split of budget and staffing resources 
to the Democrats, thereby gaining a strong alliance 
with the former chairman, ranking Democrat 
Lawton Chiles of Florida. At a time when the 
new Republican leadership was asking all Senate 
committees to cut at least 10 percent from their 
committee operations budgets, Heinz and Chiles 
together were able to secure a 50 percent increase 
for the Aging Committee.
Heinz selected staff members based on their 
experience, policy skills, and productivity, not their 
political affiliations or ideologies. In fact, most 
of the staff members he hired were registered 
Democrats or Independents. This unlikely 
arrangement led to a few awkward moments. 
When he was trying to get a new prescription 
drug benefit included in Medicare catastrophic 
care legislation in 1987, Heinz had to remind 
his staff that, because he was a Republican, they 
should be getting input from Reagan’s Health 
and Human Services secretary. After the 1988 
elections, when he sought positions for two of 
his senior staff members in the incoming George 
H.W. Bush administration, Bush aides were not 
happy to discover that both were Democrats.
maintained an ambitious program that included 
34 legislative, investigative, or oversight hearings 
in Washington, D.C.; field hearings around the 
country; and production of more than 60 papers 
and reports. After the Democrats regained control 
of the Senate in the 1986 elections, Heinz became 
the committee’s ranking minority member and held 
that post until his untimely death in 1991. During 
this time period, and especially during his 1981–86 
chairmanship, he had a prolific, lasting impact on 
how older Americans are treated.
Chapters 2 through 7 of this study look at Heinz’s 
actions on six specific legislative topics; Chapter 8 
briefly describes the last, ambitious investigation 
in which he was involved; and Chapter 9 considers 
the lasting significance of Heinz’s career. But first, 
this initial chapter illuminates what made Heinz 
effective, exemplary, and memorable as a senator 
by taking us on a fascinating trip behind the scenes 
at the Senate Special Committee on Aging. After 
Heinz’s death, three men who had served him as 
Aging Committee staff director—John Rother, 
Stephen McConnell, and Larry Atkins—came 
together to assemble their recollections in a highly 
entertaining, heretofore unpublished memoir. With 
their permission, this first chapter and its insights 
on how a great senator actually did his work are 
drawn primarily from that document.
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briefing memo that laid out the entire range of 
views held by interest groups and compared them 
to the perspectives of public health experts. Heinz 
read the memo thoroughly, marked it up with 
questions he wanted to have answered, and used 
the information to align his subsequent votes with 
sound public health policy.
Heinz’s decision-making system depended on 
the Decision/Action Memo, a form his staff used 
to organize information relevant to a decision. 
On a typical day, five such memos from Aging 
Committee staff members and another five or 
so from his personal or other committee staff 
members went into his evening folder. Heinz 
returned them the next morning with his decisions 
or with further questions.
To make this system work, Heinz heavily 
valued academic capacity and credentials. For 
example, when a capable staff member was under 
consideration for promotion, Heinz asked to see 
the staffer’s college transcript. This request posed a 
challenge, as the staffer had no college degree! But 
McConnell, then Aging Committee staff director, 
found a creative way to protect the candidate: 
He prepared a mock transcript, complete with 
invented course names and official-looking stamps, 
and sent it to Heinz. After probing some of the 
oddities of the phony transcript, Heinz caught 
on to the joke—and conceded that, in this case, 
Most of the time, however, 
Heinz’s tendency not to 
think much about party 
affiliation was to his 
advantage, as he was able 
to build bridges across the 
aisle rather than alienating 
Senate colleagues. In 
preparations for the 1988 
campaign, Heinz’s staff 
found the fruit of this 
approach in an impressive statistic: An unusually 
high 60 percent of the legislation introduced by 
Heinz had been passed.
POLICy WONK
Most elected officials, constantly beleaguered 
by busy schedules, ask for one-page memos so 
that they can make decisions quickly. Heinz was 
different. Having taught public policy at Carnegie 
Mellon University and served as a staffer himself 
for U.S. Senator Hugh Scott, Heinz thrived on 
policy substance. He had a voracious appetite 
for briefing material, demanding well-reasoned 
arguments and seeking to absorb as much 
information as possible to guide his decisions.
On one occasion, an Aging Committee staffer, 
feeling that Heinz needed more detailed 
background on AIDS issues, prepared a 25-page 
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he could appreciate the staffer’s long track record 
of successful performance despite the lack of 
academic degrees.
Heinz also made publication of policy materials 
on aging a committee priority. Before his arrival, 
the annual committee publication, Developments in 
Aging, was largely produced by the Congressional 
Research Service and was focused mainly on 
legislative and administrative developments. Under 
Heinz’s leadership, it became a policy textbook 
prepared primarily by committee staff, with each 
staffer responsible for sections of the volume 
related to his or her policy area. In addition, the 
Committee pioneered an annual statistical report 
on the aging population, a task subsequently taken 
on by AARP. 
heinz speaks to a voter during his first campaign for the u.s. senate, 1976.
minority member. Unshaken by that caution, he 
and a committee staff member began framing 
the issue and educating Congress and the public 
anyway. The committees of jurisdiction eventually 
agreed to hold hearings, mark up a bill Heinz 
had introduced, and move it to the Senate and 
House floors. Within a year, the bill became law, 
giving Heinz his first chance to participate in a 
presidential signing ceremony in the White House 
Rose Garden.
Heinz was equally methodical in his treatment 
of witnesses at Aging Committee hearings. On 
one hand, he was endearing toward constituents, 
senior citizens, and “victim” witnesses who came 
before the committee, making a special effort 
to make them feel comfortable and appreciated. 
On the other hand, bureaucrats or company 
executives with anything to hide dreaded coming 
before him. His questioning was well informed, 
sharp, and often guided by an intent to highlight 
predetermined conclusions. Aging Committee 
hearings were not simply information-gathering 
sessions; they were publicity events, giving 
Heinz a chance to promote on the national stage 
concerns that he had already identified. Like a 
good lawyer, rarely did he ask a question without 
already knowing the answer. A U.S. Social Security 
Administration official given rough treatment at 
one hearing was caught by a nearby microphone 
whispering to an aide, “This is a setup.”
DOGGED
Heinz may not have made enemies on Capitol 
Hill, but he did have the capacity to irritate people 
with his unflagging determination. Once he 
committed to doing something, he pursued the goal 
tenaciously. If he entered a Finance Committee 
meeting with a series of proposed amendments 
to a Medicare bill, he would not quit presenting 
them until all had been either approved or firmly 
rejected—even if it meant extending the session 
into the evening. The irritation sometimes shown 
by the committee chair or by other colleagues rarely 
deterred him. 
Heinz tirelessly 
shepherded proposals 
through the legislative 
process—identifying 
issues, developing public 
and congressional 
awareness, drafting 
legislation, and working it 
painstakingly through the 
Senate and House. A 1982 
effort to pass legislation 
protecting the right of victims of federal crimes 
exemplifies his methodical, persistent approach. 
When he first raised the issue, Heinz was told that 
no major crime legislation would move through 
the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary due 
to conflicts between its chairman and ranking 
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or oversight purpose and a list of witnesses but 
a main story line, a media relations plan, and 
expected outcomes. A few days before the hearing, 
he intensified the scripting further, asking for 
specific objectives to be achieved through each 
witness and a detailed line of questioning (with 
anticipated responses and follow-up questions).
Heinz was equally sensitive to his visual 
presence. After sound technicians 
observed that the Senator’s low chair 
made him look small on the dais, the 
Chief Clerk proposed putting an 
additional foam cushion in the chair 
so that he “would sit as tall as [he] 
stand[s].” Thereafter, if 
the extra cushion was 
absent, Heinz would 
tease the Chief Clerk 
about the oversight and 
ask for the cushion so 
that he could “sit tall.”
Beginning in 1983, Heinz further bolstered his 
capacity for generating high-visibility, media-
worthy oversight hearings by creating an Aging 
Committee investigative unit of four staff members 
who used highly aggressive, enterprising methods 
to uncover fraud, waste, and mismanagement in 
government programs.
MEDIA MONGER?
Heinz was a master at using the media to his 
benefit, to the extent that some in the Senate 
viewed him as a showman. On one occasion, the 
Senate Majority Leader, stymied in moving a 
key piece of legislation by a Heinz amendment 
tactic, sent his staff to the Senate press galleries to 
circulate disparaging stories about Heinz’s supposed 
media fixation. But, actually, media attention was 
never Heinz’s goal; legislative achievement was 
the goal, and media coverage was a tool to get him 
there. Heinz didn’t care whether the coverage was 
friendly as long as it was serving his legislative 
purpose. As he would frequently emphasize to his 
press secretary, “There is good press, bad press, and 
no press, in that order. Let’s not ever have no press.” 
Under Heinz’s meticulous leadership, Aging 
Committee hearings were carefully choreographed 
to secure the desired publicity results. Above all, 
they were solution driven. Heinz required that 
each hearing proposal include not just a legislative 
12
In 1983, frustrated with Reagan administration 
denials of social security disability payments 
to people with mental impairments, he 
coordinated an Aging Committee hearing 
with the development of a PBS FRONTLINE 
documentary on the topic. The following year, 
still dissatisfied with the pace of change, he 
got the President’s attention by holding field 
hearings in Illinois and Texas, two important 
states in Reagan’s 1984 reelection bid. The adverse 
media attention and outcry from state officials 
resulted in a complete capitulation by the Reagan 
administration on social security disability 
determinations. (See Chapter 3 for a more detailed 
examination of this issue.)
Heinz’s supposed media mongering, just like his 
inexhaustible determination and long hours of 
policy study, was part of his drive to be an excellent 
and effective senator—a goal he unquestionably 
achieved.  C
One of Heinz’s best performances on the Aging 
Committee stage was a hearing on administrative 
problems with social security. In 1983, having 
received a sea of complaints about processing 
delays and check disbursement errors, he called 
an oversight hearing. In advance, he had his staff 
collect and analyze beneficiary letters. Along 
the way, they found a wonderful star witness: a 
distinguished older gentleman from Ohio whose 
Social Security checks had been withdrawn from 
his bank account without prior notice after the 
Social Security Administration had determined he 
was dead. The witness, very much alive, appeared 
on all three network morning news shows on the 
morning of the hearing and then gave compelling 
testimony that appeared on the evening news. The 
negative publicity led quickly to a policy change at 
the U.S. Department of the Treasury on account 
withdrawals and spurred initiatives to streamline 
and automate Social Security procedures.
Heinz didn’t just play to the media; he played along 
with them. In 1982, he teamed up with the media 
to investigate pacemaker marketing abuse. Aging 
Committee investigators used concealed video 
cameras to film pacemaker salesmen as they tried to 
persuade physicians to do unnecessary operations, 
replacing properly functioning old-model 
pacemakers with new, more expensive ones. After 
the footage was televised, Heinz held a hearing to 
interrogate witnesses from the companies caught in 
the act.
13
heinz delivers remarks at the commission on affairs of the elderly, 1982.
The year 1981 also saw Ronald Reagan assume the 
presidency, with a limited-government philosophy 
not seen in the White House since before the New 
Deal. The administration’s reform proposals provoked 
Democratic reactions that Reagan was interested in 
cutting social security, not saving it.1 In December, 
the two sides okayed a stopgap measure that would 
permit the main social security trust fund, the Old-
age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund, to borrow 
from the other two trust funds for one year. They 
also agreed on the appointment of the bipartisan 
15-member National Commission on Social Security 
Reform to examine the system’s fiscal woes and make 
recommendations by the end of 1982.
Reagan tapped Alan Greenspan, who had chaired 
the Council of Economic Advisers for President 
Gerald Ford in 1974–77 and would later become 
Federal Reserve chair, to lead the commission. 
Heinz successfully lobbied Senate Majority 
Leader Howard Baker to become one of his five 
appointees. His interest was not surprising; social 
security’s short-term financial problems had been 
the topic of the first Aging Committee hearing he 
chaired, on June 16, 1981, just five weeks after the 
Reagan administration had released its proposals. 
saving social security 
(1981–83)
As John Heinz assumed the chairmanship of the 
U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging in 1981, 
he faced a major crisis in aging policy. America’s 
social security program, enacted in 1935 as the 
federal government’s main way to ensure the 
financial stability of retired Americans, was in 
serious fiscal danger.
During the 1970s, a slow economy and an increasing 
number of beneficiaries eroded social security’s 
healthy surplus. Cost-of-living adjustments (or 
COLAs) of benefit amounts, which were based 
on consumer price increases beginning in 1975, 
hastened that erosion; COLA was an all-time high 
of 9.9 percent in 1979, then soared to 14.3 percent in 
1980 and a still-high 11.2 percent in 1981. By then, 
some experts were predicting that social security 
could slide into insolvency as soon as the following 
year. Congress raised the payroll tax rate (the amount 
withheld from an employee’s income, with employers 
being required to contribute an equal amount) quite 
steeply, from 5.85 percent in 1977 to 6.65 percent in 
1981, but this was still not enough.
Chapter 2
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  nearing retirement age. The immediate 
problem with financing social security is 
critical but manageable. Older Americans 
and contributing workers should be reassured 
that the social security system can meet its 
obligations in the near future without major 
changes in the program.
Heinz did not wish to buck a popular Republican 
president during his first months in office, but 
he also wanted to use his Aging Committee 
chairmanship to become a statesman looking out 
for America’s seniors. And he also was sensitive to 
how quickly social security’s pay-as-you-go system 
could collapse politically if citizens began to fear 
that Congress might slash the benefits they were 
counting on.
As Larry Atkins recalled, “Senator Heinz was 
standing on a precipice between trying to be a good 
Republican on one hand and recognizing on the 
other hand that he was the leading spokesperson 
on the Senate side for older Americans and 
for everybody who would someday be an older 
American.” While Senator Bill Armstrong 
(R-Colorado) and Representative Bill Archer 
(R-Texas) staked out the fiscally conservative 
positions on the Greenspan Commission, and while 
Democrats leaned toward tax increases, Heinz 
sought a more balanced solution.
In his introductory statement at that hearing, he 
displayed his preference for measured actions over 
what he perceived as overreactions or scare tactics 
(even if used by a president from his own party):
  We meet today because of a problem in 
the social security system. It is a problem 
with financing the system over the next five 
years, and over the next 75 years. But most 
importantly, it is a problem with public 
confidence in the solvency of the system and 
in the commitment of Government to meet 
future benefit obligations. This erosion of 
public confidence is the most serious of all 
threats to the solvency of the social security 
system. Without the willingness of workers 
to contribute from earnings today to protect 
themselves in the future, there could be no 
social security program.
  
  While the administration’s recent pronounce-
ments that the social security system is on 
the verge of collapse have helped to highlight 
the problems we face in financing the system, 
they have also furthered this erosion in public 
confidence. These warnings of imminent 
failure, accompanied by proposals for 
major, immediate changes in benefits, have 
unnecessarily caused extreme anxiety and anger 
among current beneficiaries and among those 
16
strategic middle. As a November 8 memo to 
Heinz from staff member Kate Clarke stated, “you 
are generally regarded as a potential mediator in 
the upcoming Commission meeting.”
Heinz promptly used his position to float a 
compromise solution, suggesting that social 
security reform should depend equally on 
increased taxes and reduced benefits to fill the 
financial hole. The Senator H. John Heinz III 
Archives at Carnegie Mellon University in 
Pittsburgh contain handwritten notes that Heinz 
apparently used when presenting his position:
  We are not going to get anywhere—and 
neither will the Congress—if we all hold fast 
to our positions. I would like to make a two-
part proposal: first, that both sides agree to 
split making up the shortfalls, half through 
revenue increases and half through benefit 
savings. Second, I will undertake to make the 
first proposal—simply as a basis of starting 
practical discussion, or, alternatively, each 
side agree to propose to the other the most 
acceptable (to them) means of doing what 
they don’t really want to do.
Politically, Heinz’s 
appointment was useful 
to the Republican Party, 
as his less hard-nosed 
nature and his emergence 
as a representative of 
older Americans could 
counter the presence of 
beloved octogenarian and 
House Aging Committee 
Chairman Claude Pepper 
(D-Florida). But his moderate stance also made 
him an important bridge builder and deal maker  
on the commission.
“Heinz was without a doubt the best policy 
analyst on the committee,” Atkins stated. “But, 
in this case, he was in with a lot of heavy hitters.” 
Senate Finance Committee Chairman Bob 
Dole (R-Kansas) maintained close contact with 
the White House, while former Social Security 
Commissioner Robert Ball was the voice of House 
Speaker Tip O’Neill (D-Massachusetts). Without 
their support, no deal would happen. 
The 1982 election season was too charged for 
compromise, as Pepper led Democratic campaign 
efforts to accuse Republicans of preparing to scuttle 
social security.2 But when the commission met  
after Election Day, Heinz was well placed in the 
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Committee. In his “Dear Colleague” letter 
supporting the bill, Heinz diplomatically captured 
the nature of this unpleasant but balanced 
compromise, calling it “an equitable and realistic 
effort to restore solvency to the Social Security 
system. None of the individual components are 
attractive by themselves, yet the recommendations 
taken as a whole fairly spread the financial burden 
between workers/employers and beneficiaries.”
The final legislation, signed by President Reagan in 
April 1983, combined payroll tax hikes with a six-
month delay in cost-of-living adjustments and a 
very gradual increase in the retirement age. Would 
it have happened without Heinz’s moderating 
presence on the Greenspan Commission? Possibly. 
But as the clearest middle-of-the-road voice 
on the commission, he likely made achieving a 
solution easier.  C
Heinz’s compromise proposal initially gained 
no traction. In December 1982, unable to reach 
agreement, the commission adjourned with no plan 
for additional meetings. The attempt at a bipartisan 
solution appeared to have failed.
But, as so often happens at the brink of a policy 
catastrophe, positions finally began to soften 
after Dole and fellow commission member 
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-New york) 
talked on the Senate floor and agreed that they 
could not settle for failure. They resumed quiet 
discussions, bringing Ball and two other Greenspan 
Commission members into their meetings. In 
mid-January 1983, they reached agreement in 
principle on a package that the White House 
and congressional leaders of both parties could 
support. Although Heinz was not involved in these 
meetings, the template used to break the logjam—
the principle that tax increases should equal benefit 
reductions—was his.
On January 15, 1983, the commission reconvened 
and provided political cover for O’Neill and 
Reagan with a 12–3 endorsement; only Armstrong, 
Archer, and one Democrat dissented. Heinz 
then cosponsored (with Dole and Moynihan) 
legislation in the Senate to enact the commission’s 
recommendations, played a major role in Senate 
floor debate on the bill, and testified in support of 
the measure before the House Ways and Means 
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heinz assists with cutting the ceremonial ribbon at the allegheny valley hospital dedication, 1983.
heinz visits pittsburgh veterans hospital, 1982. at right is then pitt department of medicine chair gerald levey.
Security Income (SSI) were continuing to receive 
federal paychecks even though their conditions 
had improved.
Shortly after taking office in 1981, the Reagan 
administration, spotting a chance to demonstrate 
efficiency and take a bite out of the social security 
financing problem as well, decided to initiate 
this review process 10 months early. Instructions 
were sent to the state welfare agencies that 
would actually carry out the reviews. During the 
13-month period beginning March 1, 1981, SSA 
selected 368,500 cases for investigation; by the end 
of 1982, the total number of cases selected had 
risen to 748,000, and 340,000 people, or nearly 
half, had seen their eligibility revoked.3  
“The way they did the reviews,” Larry Atkins 
explained colorfully, “was that they pulled 
the records, had a physician say something, 
and determined from a paper review whether 
[the recipient] was still eligible or not. [If the 
determination was unfavorable,] they sent a notice 
kicking them off the rolls … and describing these 
appeal rights that people had if they weren’t so 
freaked that they jumped out a window. It was 
kind of a screwy process in the sense that they 
were knocking people off the rolls without a lot 
of new information and then forcing them to 
crawl back on [by appeal] over an extended period 
of time.” More than 60 percent of those who 
who decides disability? 
(1981–84)
For three years, John Heinz played the starring role 
in an unusually gripping battle against bureaucracy, 
demonstrating determination, creativity, and guts 
to publicize and eventually eliminate an injustice 
suffered by hundreds of thousands of social security 
recipients with disabilities.
From 1970 through 1978, the annual cost of 
the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) 
program, created in 1956 to assist adults who 
could not work due to disability, quadrupled to $13 
billion a year. In 1980, Congress passed legislation 
designed to reduce spending both through 
benefit cuts (of up to 18 percent) and by offering 
incentives, such as ongoing eligibility for Medicaid, 
to people who did return to work. A less-prominent 
provision in the law (PL 96-265) required the 
U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA) to 
undertake, starting in 1982, a three-year review of 
state decisions declaring individuals to be disabled. 
Congress took this step in response to concerns 
that perhaps as many as 20 percent of the nation’s 
4 million beneficiaries of SSDI and Supplemental 
Chapter 3
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On his visit to Harrisburg, McArdle recalled 
later, he heard after-hours horror stories from 
state workers who were carrying out the reviews 
as directed but were frustrated by the policy 
guidelines. For example, one man suffering from 
mental illness was declared able to work because 
he could feed his dog.
A Philadelphia woman who had been on SSDI 
for years and suffered from serious mental health 
conditions committed suicide not long after her 
benefits were abruptly terminated. McArdle’s 
review of the case file uncovered numerous 
breaches in standard disability investigation policy; 
for example, there was no explanation of why SSA 
disregarded the opinion of the treating psychiatrist 
that the woman remained severely disabled. Heinz 
documented the procedural flaws in a lengthy 
letter to U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) Secretary Margaret Heckler that 
also was released to the media. 
 
In December 1982, Congress responded to the 
rising torrent of complaints by passing legislation 
that permitted people removed from the rolls to 
continue to receive benefits while on appeal. “While 
this is only a temporary measure, it is a significant 
step in the right direction toward reform of a 
process in serious disarray,” said Heinz.4
appealed the determination eventually regained 
their benefits, but they experienced great hardship 
and emotional turmoil along the way. 
As complaints about the process began to reach 
Heinz in spring 1982, he acted quickly, requesting 
a study by the former General Accounting Office 
(GAO; now the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office) and directing his staff to carry out its 
own investigation. Aging Committee staff 
director John Rother assigned the issue to Frank 
McArdle, who had formerly worked for the 
Social Security Administration. McArdle “had 
good inside sources,” Rother noted, with the 
result that concerned staff members within SSA 
surreptitiously steered him toward egregious cases. 
A November 11, 1982, summary of staff activities 
described what they were finding:
  Went with GAO to a secret meeting with disability 
examiners in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. In a frank 
discussion, they admitted that the tremendous 
workload of CDIs [continuing disability 
investigations] is having an adverse effect on 
decisions, and that the changes in SSA’s criteria are 
unjust. … GAO has accumulated a lot of evidence 
that a moratorium is desirable on psychiatric CDIs. 
They have found a shocking pattern of cutting 
people off the rolls on the flimsiest of bases. They 
also found that these result from signals sent by 
SSA’s Office of Quality Assurance.
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Heinz set the tone for the hearing in his well-
documented and ominous opening statement, a 
portion of which follows:
  I am concerned by evidence that severely 
disabled individuals have been terminated 
from the rolls because they can feed their dog, 
watch television, or play the piano. Individuals 
involuntarily committed to a state mental 
institution have been told they are able to 
work—even while they remain committed 
in such a mental institution, against their 
will, because of the danger they pose to 
themselves and to society. And severely disabled 
individuals, who don’t wear their disabilities on 
their shirtsleeves, are not given a thorough and 
realistic evaluation of their ability to work, and 
are denied benefits because they make a neat, 
polite appearance. 
 
  I am concerned because such decisions are 
frequently made by personnel not qualified in 
psychiatry or psychology.
  But most of all, I am concerned about the harsh 
human toll of the reviews on the estimated 
600,000 to 700,000 individuals on the social 
security and SSI rolls whose primary disability 
is a severe mental illness.
With a permanent solution 
not yet forthcoming, Heinz 
scheduled a special two-
day Aging Committee 
hearing for April 7 and 
8, 1983. The hearing 
focused on the treatment 
of recipients with mental 
disabilities, because the 
injustices perpetrated 
against this group were 
poignant and easiest to demonstrate. Whereas the 
executive branch frequently testifies first at such 
hearings, Heinz instead scheduled the SSA deputy 
commissioner as the first witness on the second 
day, after the presentation of various cases and 
testimony from state employees on the first day.
Before the hearing, Heinz asked McArdle to 
prepare him for the challenge of questioning 
witnesses with mental impairments. After McArdle 
described what behaviors the senator could expect 
from them, Heinz responded: “Oh, that should 
be fine—it sounds a lot like some of my Senate 
colleagues.” 
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Heinz proceeded to grill Simmons for 
approximately two hours, drawing on his detailed 
awareness of the SSA review system and its 
problems. He concluded by lambasting SSA for 
putting such vulnerable persons through a “meat 
grinder” and called for a moratorium on disability 
review until new guidelines could be established.
By spotlighting compelling cases of government-
inflicted human suffering, Heinz turned an arcane 
bureaucratic squabble into a major media event. 
The April 8 summary memo of Aging Committee 
Communications Director Isabelle Claxton 
reported that all three television networks, the 
top two national news services, and numerous 
newspapers covered the event; Heinz also appeared 
on the Good Morning America television program.
FRONTLINE included clips of Heinz’s 
performance at the hearing in its broadcast. New 
York Times writer John Corry, who previewed 
the program, described the impact in this way: 
“In a Senate hearing Senator Heinz conducts, 
the deputy commissioner of the Social Security 
Administration tries to explain the policy. Even 
the most sympathetic listener would find the 
explanation unintelligible. It is a devastating 
insight into bureaucracy.” 5  
Heinz first called on a representative from GAO, 
which had found that, among the mental disability 
denials processed under SSA’s 1981 directives and 
subsequently appealed, an amazing 91 percent were 
overturned. GAO also unearthed information on 
the cursory reviews used to assess the severity of 
a claimant’s mental illness. Heinz called GAO’s 
findings “really damning evidence of a callously 
uncaring system that is unremittingly unfair.” 
Various other professionals then described a host 
of disturbing cases, including many denials after 
which beneficiaries had deteriorated or even 
committed suicide. Officials from New york 
State spoke of their decision to sue the federal 
government over the direction they had received 
regarding how to conduct disability determinations.
The committee then recessed until the following 
morning, at which time Paul Simmons, an SSA 
deputy commissioner, was the featured witness. 
Upon observing the television cameras in the 
hearing room, Simmons remarked to an aide, 
“This is a setup.” In a sense, he was right. Heinz 
had invited a crew from the Public Broadcasting 
Service’s FRONTLINE documentary program to 
film the hearing. Simmons’ remark was captured on 
a microphone and appeared when FRONTLINE 
aired a segment on SSA disability determinations 
two months later, on June 20. 
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At Heinz’s urging, the Senate easily passed an 
amendment requiring a six-month moratorium 
on reviews of beneficiaries with mental illness. 
Though this provision did not pass the House, the 
growing pressure from Heinz and others caused the 
Reagan administration, in June 1983, to announce 
several procedural changes and to place a temporary 
moratorium on reviews of most mental health 
disability cases. The administration’s announcement 
came shortly after The Washington Post, assisted by 
McArdle’s research, obtained and published a photo 
of President Reagan embracing a Congressional 
Medal of Honor winner who had subsequently 
suffered the cutoff of his disability benefits. Heinz 
expressed appreciation that “the Administration 
is finally acknowledging the carnage these reviews 
have inflicted on thousands of our most vulnerable 
citizens” but noted that the changes were “not a 
solution.” 6 
The Aging Committee scheduled field hearings in 
Chicago (with Republican Illinois Senator Charles 
Percy) on February 16 and Dallas (with Texas 
House Democrats Jonas Martin “Marty” Frost and 
J.J. Pickle) on February 17. Atkins was sent to Texas 
to look for people who could testify at the hearing 
there. As he explained:
  We needed to find people who were clearly and 
convincingly disabled. We had the names of a 
couple in Dallas. I was driving through well-
manicured suburbs, trying to figure out how 
someone on disability insurance could be living 
here. But then the road suddenly came to an 
end and we hadn’t hit our house number yet. 
you could see this little dirt road go down into a 
gully, and way in the back was a little cabin. Sure 
enough, we found a husband and wife who were 
sharing a respirator, both bedridden.  
We managed to arrange for  
medical transport so that  
they could tell  
their story.
As the presidential election year of 1984 dawned, 
a solution was still not in sight. SSA had stopped 
negotiating disability review changes with Congress 
in October 1983, and at a January 1984 Finance 
Committee hearing, SSA’s acting commissioner 
testified that his agency opposed new legislation. 
Meanwhile, some influential senators, including 
Bob Dole and Russell Long (D-Louisiana), 
remained more focused on helping SSA to remove 
undeserving beneficiaries from the rolls than on the 
concerns Heinz had raised.7 So Heinz upped the 
ante, hitting the administration in the best way  
he knew how. As Atkins recalled it, Heinz stated, 
“The only thing they’re going to be paying attention 
to is the election and whether they can deliver 
Texas and Illinois. So let’s go to Texas and Illinois.”
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  The Democrats are going to make fairness the 
issue in the fall campaign, and I do not want to 
see my President hurt because of an insensitive 
bureaucracy that is running out of control.
 
  When a few disabled people are rendered 
destitute and afraid, that is casework for a 
Member of Congress or a Senator. When 
it is tens of thousands, it is time to bring 
the problem forcefully and urgently to the 
President’s attention, and I believe these 
hearings will help to do exactly that.
The two hearings detailed seven specific cases, 
which were followed by testimony from state 
eligibility reviewers and other officials who 
objected to SSA’s guidelines for the reviews. The 
strategy worked.
“We got front-page stories in the Chicago and 
Texas press about how heartless, cruel, and 
unthinking the Reagan people were,” Atkins said. 
“They didn’t appreciate that. So they finally called 
Heinz and said, ‘Okay, we’re throwing in the towel 
on this one; we’ll back off this policy. you win. Just 
don’t do any more of these field hearings.’ ”
A few weeks later, the man, John Roberts, sat before 
Heinz at the Dallas hearing. He explained that 
he had broken both legs in a 1972 steel industry 
accident, had heart disease, was a diabetic, and was 
caring for a bedfast wife besides but had received a 
letter in 1983 stating that he was up for termination 
because reviewers said he could stand for four hours 
and lift 20 pounds. Heinz guided Roberts through 
explaining that the reviewers never cited any 
evidence of what he could lift nor did they suggest 
what type of work he could possibly do—they just 
“said I would have to find something.”
While creating a media nightmare for the White 
House, Heinz deftly presented himself as doing the 
Reagan administration a favor, as recorded in his 
opening statement at the Chicago hearing:
  Now, there is one other reason, and I speak 
somewhat personally about this, for us in 
Congress to act. As one American, I believe 
very deeply that this country happens to need 
Ronald Reagan’s leadership, and I want to 
see the President reelected. And although 
these disability reviews were set in motion 
by the previous administration, the Carter 
administration, the failure to correct a flawed 
system that daily creates more disaster for 
genuinely disabled persons who paid for this 
insurance lends credibility to the President’s 
opponents who talk about fairness.
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heinz visits with a patient at the va pittsburgh healthcare system–university drive, July 19,1982.
To Rother, Heinz’s involvement with the SSDI 
issue epitomized his dogged yet humble political 
style: “He was pushing for legislative change, not 
political advancement. He took on, almost as a 
solo project, a very tough issue that most people 
would have backed out of. The group of us staff 
members who worked with Heinz on this issue 
had never been more proud of a senator because of 
that combination of determination and not caring 
what the odds were. It was a Hollywood movie 
kind of experience, and the staff became more loyal 
to him as a result.”  C
In March 1984, two weeks after the House had 
passed by a vote of 410–1 a bill to make it more 
difficult for SSA to cut a recipient’s benefits, 
HHS Secretary Heckler announced a nationwide 
moratorium on disability reviews. In September,  
the final bill (PL 98-460) passed unanimously in 
both houses; President Reagan quietly signed it  
in October.
“What Heinz brought to many issues like this 
one,” McArdle stated, “was a sense of outrage. He 
could channel his anger toward public policy that 
would correct the injustices that hurt vulnerable 
populations. When he seized upon a situation like 
that, he wouldn’t let go. His outrage over what 
was happening to defenseless people gave him an 
energy and a commitment to see it through.”
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heinz with senator Jacob Javits, 1980
ERISA required businesses to conform to one of 
the following vesting options. If a company chose 
“cliff vesting,” under which employees jump from 
having no vesting rights to becoming fully vested 
all at once, the tenure required for an employee to 
become vested was 10 years. If employees received 
vesting rights gradually, the time period required for 
full pension eligibility could be extended to 15 years.
This was a significant change, as 72 percent of all 
pension plans were not compliant with ERISA’s 
vesting standards before 1974.8 But Javits was still 
disappointed. He had wanted to limit the cliff 
vesting period to five years rather than 10 and had 
conceded this point in final negotiations.
Now, in the Senators’ private dining room, the 
ailing Javits addressed his protégé with a simple 
request: that Heinz fix this law for him.
Thus Heinz became a pension reformer. It was 
an area suited to his love for policy detail and his 
willingness to engage in unseen, unappreciated 
policymaking. As he commented later, pension 
regulations have “very little sex appeal and a lot of 
complexity. ... The people you help are never going 
to know that you helped them, and the people 
you have a direct and measurable impact on—
employers—often find the reform unpalatable.” 9  
finishing his mentor’s 
work: heinz and pension 
reform (1984–86)
Around 1984, former Senator Jacob Javits (R-New 
york) paid a poignant visit to John Heinz. Javits 
served four terms (1957–81) as one of the U.S. 
Senate’s more liberal Republicans and was an 
important mentor to Heinz after the latter’s 
entrance into the Senate in 1977. But Javits’ 
diagnosis of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS, or 
Lou Gehrig’s disease) contributed to his defeat by 
Alfonse D’Amato in the 1980 Republican Senate 
primary. By 1984, he was confined to a wheelchair 
and dependent on supplementary oxygen.
One of Javits’ most significant achievements 
as a senator had been his role in the passage of 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) in 1974. Before ERISA, businesses had 
free rein to establish pension eligibility rules, and 
many of them required employees to remain with 
the company for 20 years or until a certain age in 
order to become vested (i.e., entitled to receive 
benefits from employers’ contributions to the 
pension fund).
Chapter 4
31
Heinz promoted his pension reform goals by 
holding an Aging Committee hearing in June 
1985 titled “The Pension Gamble: Who Wins, 
Who Loses?” He repeated the pattern that had 
worked so well on social security disability, filling 
the opening panel with aggrieved citizens. The first 
witness was an Ohio woman who, upon retiring 
after 30 years with J.C. Penney Company, Inc., 
was informed that she would not be receiving a 
pension because her social security benefits were 
considered sufficient financial support. Next came 
a woman who was laid off six months before she 
could fulfill the 10-year vesting requirement, a 
23-year bank employee who had no pension rights 
because she was classified as an hourly rather than 
a salaried employee, and an engineer who had 
accumulated virtually no pension over 22 years 
because of frequent job changes.
 
In October 1985, Heinz introduced Senate Bill 
1784, the Retirement Income Policy Act. The 
legislation contained three main policy goals: 
(1) to reduce the standard vesting period from 
10 years to five; (2) to require employers, if they 
operated a pension plan, to offer it to all their 
employees; and (3) to revise the rules governing 
the integration of pension benefits with social 
security benefits (thus fixing cases like that of the 
retiree from J.C. Penney). Representative Bill Clay 
(D-Missouri) introduced companion legislation in 
the House.
Larry Atkins, who staffed this issue for Heinz, 
described how the strategy unfolded:
  We started out by doing dinner meetings. We 
would have a big dinner downtown at one of 
the Chinese restaurants, and they’d bring out 
course after course. And we could have a couple 
guys from the Treasury Department there, and 
some Democratic and Republican staff who 
specialized in pension issues, and the insurance 
industry and the employer community were 
represented. We had several months of these 
dinners, and everybody put on the table their 
ideas about what needed to be done to improve 
the pension system. If you let people have a 
drink or two and you have camaraderie and 
a good time, and then you start talking about 
policy outside of your roles, you can get to pretty 
much the same place. And we did.
 
  So then we said it wasn’t going to do us any 
good to just keep drinking and eating—we were 
going to actually have to put pen to paper. So 
we started holding almost a year of meetings 
on the Hill, trying to design a comprehensive 
pension reform bill that could be broadly 
supported both outside and inside the Congress. 
It was an unusual process because we brought 
representatives of industry into the room to draft 
the legislation with us.
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blocking the benefit cut, which under the rules of 
the Senate at that time you could definitely do,” 
said staff member Frank McArdle. “[White House 
budget director] David Stockman called him on it, 
but Heinz stood his ground and said, ‘you can beat 
me if you have the votes.’ Heinz had the votes, and 
the administration backed down and did not cut 
those benefits.”
Stated Cliff Shannon, a member of Heinz’s 
personal staff throughout his more than 14 
years in the Senate: “I think he had a pretty 
consistent record of trying to look after ordinary 
Americans’ quality of life. Protecting people who 
were vulnerable because they were sick, they had 
lost their jobs, or their retirement income was 
threatened—for him, that was the bread and butter 
of the job.”  C
When the Tax Reform Act of 1986 began to move 
forward, Heinz decided to attempt to attach his 
pension provisions to that bill. The combination 
of worker-friendly pension proposals with a 
Reagan-inspired tax bill resulted in a battle in the 
Senate Finance Committee, where, Atkins recalled 
with a chuckle, “the Republicans were promoting 
progressive change and the Democrats were 
representing the business interests trying to stop it.” 
But Heinz prevailed, and his legislation, with minor 
modifications, became law in 1986.
If Heinz thought of pension policy as an obscure 
intellectual endeavor that few beneficiaries 
appreciated, a 1988 incident changed his mind. 
Seeking a third Senate term, he decided on a 
purely positive campaign, running ads strictly on 
his legislative accomplishments. On the day when 
the ad featuring his success in changing pension 
law appeared, Atkins recalled, daily tracking polls 
showed him getting a 2 percent boost.
While the 1986 pension amendments displayed 
Heinz’s skill in policy development and consensus 
building, they were not his first foray into pensions. 
Heinz had reacted with unusual determination 
when, in 1981, the Reagan administration proposed 
cutting benefits for a group of railroad retirees 
effective in December, right around the holiday 
season. “He went to the floor during debate on 
a defense bill and brought up an amendment 
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heinz speaks with the media, 1986
indefatigable chair of the House Select Committee 
on Aging, who was 80 and full of verve when Heinz 
became Senate Aging Committee chair in 1981.
Stephen McConnell, previously Pepper’s staff 
member on age discrimination issues, became 
Senate Aging staff director for Heinz in 1984. 
Though Heinz—still in his 40s—could not be 
Pepper’s equal as a symbol of the battle against age 
discrimination, McConnell found upon his arrival 
that mandatory retirement was already on Heinz’s 
issue list.
“Heinz was driven by the notion that people ought 
to be treated fairly,” McConnell said. “Forced 
retirement was to him an example of discrimination. 
He viewed it as the Aging Committee’s mission to 
root out inequities in the system.”
Heinz introduced legislation to abolish mandatory 
retirement for nearly all professions in the 97th, 
98th, and 99th sessions of Congress (in 1982, 
1983, and 1985). The third time around, he 
raised the issue’s visibility by holding an Aging 
Committee hearing on June 19, 1986.
Heinz emphasized the economic benefits of 
eliminating forced retirement. He observed in 
his committee hearing’s opening remarks that 
the poverty rate was three times as great among 
seniors who did not work as among those with 
let them work: the end of 
mandatory retirement 
(1984–86)
John Heinz waged with particular vigor a battle for 
a legal right central to older Americans’ quality of 
life: the right to work.
As of the 1970s, about half of all Americans were 
covered by work rules that required them to retire at 
age 65. Many companies maintained a mandatory 
retirement age because they believed that older 
workers would become unreliable and unproductive 
and that the difficulties involved in trying to 
identify and dismiss aging workers individually 
exceeded the benefits of letting productive workers 
stay on the job longer. 
In 1978, Congress, recognizing the effect of 
improved health care and longer life expectancy on 
older Americans’ capacities (and the negative fiscal 
impact on social security of the growing number 
of retirees), raised the minimum permissible 
mandatory retirement age for most occupations to 
70. But forcing people out of their jobs at 70 still 
seemed incongruous to Claude Pepper (D-Florida), 
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  Mandatory retirement at age 70, which is the law 
in this country today—or at least, it is permitted 
today under the law—like discrimination based 
upon race, religion, or sex, contradicts the well-
established principles of freedom of choice and 
job opportunity based on individual ability. But 
for at least 51 percent of the Nation’s workforce, 
mandatory retirement looms as an ominous 
shadow at the end of their careers.
 
  Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, ADEA, to prohibit arbitrary 
age discrimination on the job and to promote 
employment based on ability rather than 
age. While the intent of the law is sound, it 
flounders on the provision which ends those 
Federal protections at age 70.
 
  Today we are going to hear firsthand of the 
severe psychological and financial impact of 
forced retirement on thousands of human beings. 
This arbitrary policy will soon silence the strings 
of a concert violist and close the schoolbooks of a 
dedicated teacher, to name two.
 
jobs; that, according to a recent survey, 90 percent 
of businesses found employing older workers to 
be cost-effective; and that eliminating mandatory 
retirement would save the social security and 
Medicare programs $30 million a year by 1991.
In response to objections from business interests 
who felt that eliminating mandatory retirement 
would deny jobs to young people and advancement 
to middle-agers, Heinz noted that the American 
workforce already included 1.1 million people age 
70 or older whose employers continued to welcome 
them, while the U.S. Department of Labor projected 
that 200,000 more people would remain in their 
jobs if permitted to do so.
But his most forceful argument was for equity, as 
vividly illustrated by the first four paragraphs of his 
June 1986 hearing remarks:
  We are here today to address a Federal 
policy that really goes against the grain of 
our free enterprise system and undercuts 
the fundamental tenets of civil rights in this 
country. I am talking about the current Federal 
law permitting forced retirement of American 
workers solely on the basis of age.
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“Are your students better off today than they were 
20 or 30 years ago?” He then invited the 67-year-
old Granat to perform a movement from a Bach 
suite; the impromptu performance was highlighted 
in a Philadelphia Inquirer news article on the 
hearing the next day.10  
 
The hearing included one opponent of the 
legislation: Mark de Bernardo of the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce. Heinz promptly 
described de Bernardo’s testimony as being in 
“amazing conflict” with the experiences of the 
preceding four witnesses. After recapitulating 
their plights, Heinz asked de Bernardo, “How 
can you sit there and say, as you did just a second 
ago, that mandatory retirement at age 70 is 
‘humane’?” Later, after de Bernardo commented 
that scheduled retirements enabled companies 
to groom replacements with their promotion in 
mind, Heinz retorted: “So what you are saying is 
that for the convenience of the top managers of a 
handful of large corporations, we should force 
someone who works for the Allegheny 
County park system to retire, we 
should force a concert violist to retire, 
we should force a schoolteacher to 
retire, because it makes it easier for 
the people in the corporate suites to 
play their game of musical chairs.”
 
After Pepper, witnesses at the hearing included 
a Pittsburgh government employee forced to 
retire at age 73; a 70-year-old Connecticut public 
school teacher compelled to retire that month; 
Philadelphia Orchestra violist J. Wolfgang Granat, 
whose employer required musicians to retire at 
age 70; and the medical director of Grumman 
Corp., which had successfully eliminated its prior 
mandatory retirement policy. Actor Mickey Rooney 
was on the agenda, too, but had to cancel due to 
mechanical problems that caused his flight to 
return to Los Angeles.
 
Heinz was ready with effective leading questions 
for his witnesses. He asked the teacher, “Are you 
a better teacher today than you were 20 or 30 
years ago?” After getting the anticipated 
affirmative answer, he continued: 
38
  When Heinz saw the article, he asked me who 
was responsible. Not wanting to blame the 
staffers, I said that the buck stopped with me. 
I figured that I was finished. He looked at the 
article, looked at me, and said, “you know, I 
always wanted to be on the front page of The 
Wall Street Journal.”
Rosenthal sent Heinz a gracious letter of 
correction, dated March 3, 1986, in which he 
pointed out that he was still a “mere boy” of 63 
years. Heinz replied with a letter of apology on 
March 24, in which he concluded, “Without 
doubt it is I who have aged the more prematurely. 
Perhaps this accounts for my ever greater interest 
in the age discrimination legislation.”  C
Heinz and Pepper eventually conceded a few 
exemptions. University presidents were especially 
alarmed at the havoc that tenured professors might 
wreak if guaranteed indefinite longevity; a seven-
year phase-in period was granted for university 
employees, police, and firefighters. The bill cleared 
Congress in October 1986 and was signed into 
law—appropriately, by a 75-year-old president. 
Since 1993, the only remaining categories of 
workers upon whom mandatory retirement can 
be imposed are public safety employees, air traffic 
controllers, pilots, and high-level executives.
 
Heinz’s public relations efforts on behalf of this 
bill survived one classic gaffe that McConnell will 
never forget:
  I had two press people working for me, and they 
told me that Abe Rosenthal, then editor in chief 
of The New York Times, was turning 70 and being 
forced to retire. We got the idea that we would 
send a letter to newspapers across the country. 
Two days later, the front page of The Wall 
Street Journal carried the headline, “Heinz Eats 
Crow.” The article pointed out that not only was 
Rosenthal not being forced to retire, he wasn’t 
even turning 70!
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heinz participates in the pepper commission hearings on long-term care, 1990.
or unwilling to release. 
Not long after Michie’s 
hiring, according to 
Steve McConnell (then 
staff director), calls 
began coming in from 
government agencies 
asking McConnell to 
put a stop to this “out-
of-control” staffer’s 
activities. McConnell 
would promise to look 
into the matter—and then 
did nothing more, because 
the investigative unit had his and 
Heinz’s firm support.
 
During one of his investigations, Michie received 
a phone call summoning him to come immediately 
from the Aging Committee offices to Heinz’s 
main Senate office. He rushed over to the Russell 
Senate Office Building and, upon arrival, was 
told to sit in the outer room while another staff 
member explained that Heinz was meeting with 
Robert Windom, U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) assistant secretary for 
health. “Windom asked for an appointment to 
complain about you and your investigative unit,” 
the staff member explained. “In fact, he may even 
be looking to get Heinz to fire you.”
 
taking the gloves off: 
senator heinz’s health 
care investigations
Most members of Congress, when they want 
an in-depth investigation of a problem in the 
federal government, call on the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) or the Inspectors 
General of the various federal agencies to do 
the dirty work. John Heinz, however, was not 
satisfied to rely on other entities’ investigations. 
To confront agencies that dragged their feet 
or declined to comply when asked to produce 
documents needed for congressional oversight or 
program evaluation, Heinz hired his own Aging 
Committee investigative unit. Composed of two 
investigators ( James Michie and David Schulke) 
and two lawyers (Terri Parker DeLeon and Michael 
Werner), this highly aggressive and enterprising 
unit had explosive impact as it uncovered fraud, 
waste, abuse, and mismanagement in federal 
programs affecting older Americans.
Michie, a former investigative reporter, was 
particularly skilled in finding ways to obtain 
documentation that federal agencies were reluctant 
Chapter 6
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“I would have to say that you have just about 
zero support for using the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Hospitals for what you have 
proposed. … We hope you will take that under 
advisement and do the right thing.”
 
Public opposition caused the proposed regulations  
to be scrapped, but, due to the Reagan admini-
stration’s continuing interest in reducing federal 
oversight of nursing homes, HCFA funded 
the National Academy of Sciences’ Institute of 
Medicine to conduct an independent review of 
nursing home quality. After nearly four years 
of study, the Institute of Medicine concluded 
in 1986 that quality-of-care problems in the 
nursing care sector were widespread and that the 
federal government very rarely took action against 
substandard facilities.11  
 
Much of the concern related to suspicions that 
nursing homes, which received Medicare and 
Medicaid reimbursement based on the number of 
days of care they provided, were cutting corners on 
quality in order to maximize profits. At a February 
1983 committee hearing on alleged nursing home 
abuses, Heinz passionately deplored the apparent 
tolerance of inadequate nursing home care:
Michie waited nervously. A few minutes later, 
Heinz exited with Windom and approached Michie 
directly. “I’d like to introduce you to my chief 
investigator, Jim Michie,” Heinz told Windom. “I 
wanted you to meet him so that you knew who was 
behind all that fine oversight of your department.”
 
THE BATTLE FOR QUALITy  
NURSING CARE
Senator Heinz’s penchant for standing up for 
the most vulnerable was unmistakable in his 
determined efforts to ensure quality of care for 
America’s elderly and disabled. This concern moved 
him not just to hold hearings but also to authorize 
covert data gathering and to strongly oppose a 
Republican president.
 
In May 1982, the Reagan administration proposed 
new regulations on nursing home oversight that 
would have deleted a requirement for annual 
inspection of nursing homes and would have 
reassigned inspections from government agencies to 
the private Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Hospitals (now called the Joint Commission). Just 
seven weeks later, on July 15, Heinz convened an 
Aging Committee hearing on nursing home quality. 
The head of the federal Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA, now Centers for Medicare 
& Medicaid Services) was the first witness. After 
thanking her for her testimony, Heinz observed, 
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reimbursement, required that inspections of nursing 
facilities be unannounced, stipulated that the 
federal government would do a random sampling 
of inspections to verify state determinations, and 
directed HHS to develop sanctions for facilities that 
did not meet standards.
 
The bill gained sufficient momentum that, in  
1987, after the Democrats took over control of 
the Senate, soon-to-be Majority Leader George 
Mitchell (D-Maine) became its prime sponsor.  
The legislation eventually became part of the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 
1987. The Aging Committee’s annual summary 
publication, Developments in Aging, stated that 
the provisions were written in great detail due 
to “congressional distrust of HCFA and the 
administration on this issue.” It stipulated such 
details as staffing levels for nurses and training 
requirements for nursing assistants.
 
  If half a dozen of my coal miners in the state of 
Pennsylvania were to die in a mine accident, it 
would be cause for an immediate investigation. 
… yet somehow when 56 people die needlessly 
in a nursing home it is largely ignored. I fear, 
frankly, that it is ignored, somehow, for no 
better reason than the horrible presumption that 
human life somehow has less value as it nears 
its end; that people who are old are going to die 
soon anyway, so who cares.
While the Institute of Medicine study was ongoing, 
Heinz directed his Aging Committee staff to do 
its own two-year investigation. Released in 1986, 
the committee staff report, Nursing Home Care: The 
Unfinished Agenda, stated that more than one-third 
of the nation’s skilled nursing facilities failed to 
meet federal health, safety, and quality standards. 
The report further indicated that the problems were 
most likely understated, as, except when responding 
to a specific complaint, inspectors gave nursing 
homes advance notice of when they were coming. 
The report received prominent news coverage 
nationally, including a supportive editorial in The 
New York Times.12 
In June 1986, Heinz, accompanied by John Glenn 
(D-Ohio), introduced the Nursing Home Quality 
Reform Act. The bill set forth a nursing home 
patients’ bill of rights, established stronger conditions 
for nursing care facilities to receive Medicare 
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According to Michie, in 1984, when Heinz 
initiated an inquiry into reports of unnecessary 
surgery being performed on Medicare and 
Medicaid recipients, HCFA management at 
first attempted to deny access to relevant files. 
Unbeknownst to these gatekeepers, however, 
Heinz’s investigators had already cultivated 
confidential sources within HCFA and HHS. 
Several of these sources set up secret drop 
locations, including agreed-upon trash cans in 
agency photocopy rooms and a milk delivery box 
on the front porch of a cooperative HHS senior 
official’s home. Early each Saturday morning, 
Michie would retrieve the week’s treasures from 
the milk delivery box. Each time he visited a 
photocopy room, he would drop a pen in the trash 
can before rummaging through its contents; if 
someone entered and asked what he was doing, 
Michie would pull out the pen and explain that it 
had fallen into the can by accident. 
 
The investigative unit received invaluable support 
from HHS Inspector General Richard Kusserow, 
who was instrumental in enabling Heinz to 
obtain internal documents showing both the need 
for a second surgical opinion program (SSOP) 
to curb unnecessary publicly funded surgeries 
and HCFA’s refusal to consider this proposal. 
Ten states had prevented unnecessary medical 
procedures by successfully implementing their 
own SSOPs, and, according to Michie, HCFA was 
not anxious to admit that for years it had ignored 
The fact that this legislation passed at all was 
testament to Heinz’s determination and his 
effectiveness as a senator. But while he could write 
a bill that told the bureaucracy what to do and 
could move that bill through Congress to eventual 
passage, he still could not make the bureaucracy 
actually move. HCFA engaged in considerable 
foot-dragging with regard to implementation of 
the measure’s provisions; for example, Congress 
had directed HCFA to establish requirements for 
nursing assistant training programs by September 
1988, but HCFA did not even release proposed 
regulations until March 1990. The annual summary 
in the 1991 Developments in Aging report, published 
after Heinz’s death, noted the slow progress and 
stated that “there was a general consensus among 
members of Congress who had been active on this 
issue that the implementation of OBRA 1987 would 
progress more successfully without further legislative 
intervention.” Only posthumously did Heinz’s labors 
for quality nursing care truly blossom.
BREAKING DOWN THE WALLS  
OF CONCEALMENT
Getting information from HHS was a formidable 
challenge, but Heinz confronted it head on, sending 
his investigative unit to interview employees and 
meticulously search through agency files. When HHS 
staff attempted to block these visits, Heinz responded 
with a fusillade of letters and even subpoenas 
requesting documents and witness testimony. 
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of elderly patients; that 30–50 percent of 
pacemaker implants were unnecessary; that 
physicians were accepting kickbacks from 
manufacturers in the form of cash payments, stock 
options, and travel excursions; and that markups 
on pacemaker prices were as high as 560 percent. 
In 1985, his investigation targeted fraudulent 
practices by Cordis Corporation, one of the 
nation’s largest pacemaker manufacturers. The 
company eventually pleaded guilty to 24 charges 
and agreed to pay $124,000 in fines plus another 
$141,000 to reimburse the government for the cost 
of its investigation.
“QUICKER AND SICKER”
Senator Heinz capped his oversight agenda 
for 1985 with a comprehensive series of three 
hearings titled “Quality of Care under Medicare’s 
Prospective Payment System.” The prospective 
payment system (PPS) had been designed to 
identify a predetermined, standard reimbursement 
rate for each health care service provided to 
Medicare recipients. However, it had opened the 
door to various abuses, ranging from unnecessary 
admissions and procedures to premature 
discharges from hospitals. Heinz’s investigation 
found that HCFA had been consistently failing to 
carry out its oversight responsibilities.
 
recommendations to establish a similar program 
within Medicare.
Following extensive research and preparation, 
Heinz convened a hearing, “Unnecessary Surgery: 
Double Jeopardy for Older Americans,” in March 
1985. Kusserow, four private-sector authorities, 
and three elderly individuals threatened with 
unnecessary surgery all advocated for a mandatory 
national SSOP. Heinz criticized the Reagan 
administration for “spinning its wheels while 
millions of older Americans risk the scalpel 
unnecessarily.” He noted that individuals over age 
75 were twice as likely as younger patients to die 
during such common elective procedures as gall 
bladder removal and hernia repair, and he cited 
evidence that mandated second opinions were 
reducing the frequency of surgery by up to 45 
percent with no negative consequences for patient 
health and safety.
Despite HCFA’s continued objections, legislation 
requiring second surgical opinions for certain 
procedures covered by Medicare became law 
as part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1985.
 
In 1985, Heinz also returned to an issue he had first 
highlighted in 1982: pacemaker fraud. The 1982 
hearing on this topic had revealed that defective 
pacemakers were endangering the lives  
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The hearings on Medicare PPS abuses guided 
Heinz’s development of corrective provisions that 
became law in 1985 and 1986, ensuring access to 
quality care for Medicare beneficiaries.
 
Finally, Heinz and his investigative unit ended the 
harm caused by hundreds of dialysis clinics whose 
reuse of disposable plastic medical devices had 
resulted in numerous deaths or serious injuries. 
An oversight investigation and a March 1986 
hearing established that both the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration and HCFA had shirked 
their responsibilities in protecting dialysis patients 
from the dangers of reuse and that the U.S. Public 
Health Service had consistently misled the U.S. 
Congress, dialysis patients, and the public as to 
the safety of reused devices. Provisions to protect 
Medicare beneficiaries with end-stage renal disease 
from substandard care were passed in 1987.
 
Reflecting on his demanding but productive years 
of service to Heinz and the Aging Committee, 
Michie recalled, “Working for Senator Heinz was 
no easy matter, but his work ethic, his philosophy, 
and his abiding concern for those Americans least 
able to care and fend for themselves earned the deep 
respect of all. And when it came to discovering the 
truth, it was politics be damned!”  C
At a hearing on September 26, 1985, Heinz 
blasted the introduction of diagnostic-related 
groups (DRGs) with assigned reimbursement 
rates for each procedure. He claimed that patients 
were being assessed as “DRG winners or losers,” 
depending on the profit potential they represented 
under the current payment system. “For physicians 
around the country,” Heinz declared, “DRGs 
have created a dilemma of medical ethics versus 
profitable practice. Basically, financial incentives 
provided by the DRGs result in hospitals pressuring 
doctors to violate their own medical judgment in 
treating patients.” He coined the phrase “quicker 
and sicker” to characterize the condition of some 
patients who were pushed out of the hospital after 
treatment thanks to ill-conceived DRG incentives 
for premature discharges.
 
Before the third hearing, on November 12, Heinz 
served a subpoena on Acting HCFA Administrator 
C. McClain Haddow, demanding that he provide 
the Aging Committee with a report on the PPSs’ 
impact, which the law had required him to submit 
to Congress by December 1984. Haddow showed 
up with the documents, but Heinz berated him 
anyhow, stating, “It is a sad state of affairs indeed 
when the U.S. Congress has to resort ... to a 
subpoena to obtain information due it under law 
from an agency of the executive branch.”
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heinz speaks at a press conference alongside senator arlen specter, 1987.
President Reagan highlighted the problem of 
catastrophic health care costs in his 1986 State of 
the Union address. On November 20 of that year, 
Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary 
Otis Bowen proposed expanding Medicare 
to cover, beyond a $2,000 deductible, lengthy 
hospital stays and long-term rehabilitation. At 
that time, Medicare paid a declining share of costs 
after 60 days and nothing after 150 days, leaving 
Medicare-dependent people with serious long-
term illnesses at risk of financial ruin. But with 
other White House advisors urging reliance on 
incentives to help the insurance industry rather 
than a new government program, Reagan let 
Congress take the lead in developing legislation 
during 1987.13  
 
Heinz kicked off 1987 with a January 26 hearing 
on catastrophic health care costs. At that hearing, 
he expressed the need for a wide-ranging but 
affordable approach to reform: “We should 
avoid stopping short of a solution that is truly 
comprehensive. We have to provide for a full range 
of services … from catastrophic acute to long-term 
care. … Most of all, we need a solution which 
includes incentives for cost containment which do 
not threaten quality.” 
 
a catastrophe 
for congress: the 
catastrophic care bill 
(1987–89)
In the 1986 elections, the Democrats regained 
control of the U.S. Senate, reducing President 
Ronald Reagan’s influence and ousting John Heinz 
from his chairmanship. Though demoted to ranking 
minority member of the Aging Committee, Heinz 
reaped the benefits of his frequent collaboration 
with Democrats, maintaining good relations 
with John Melcher (D-Montana), who chaired 
the committee in 1987–88, and David Pryor 
(D-Arkansas), who took over the gavel in 1989.
 
In 1987, the major issue in aging policy was how to 
help older Americans (and their families) with the 
often enormous costs of catastrophic illness. This 
time, the White House was not the antagonist; in 
the final analysis, the taxpaying public was. Along 
the way, Heinz identified for himself a tightly 
defined role with a clear policy justification but 
also revealed his prescience regarding the political 
minefield into which Congress was treading.
 
Chapter 7
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In the midst of this process, Atkins recalled, one 
day “Heinz calls me and says, ‘Where’s HHS 
on this?’ [i.e., what is the HHS position on the 
proposed drug benefit]—because HHS had been 
pushing this catastrophic bill in the first place. I 
told him I didn’t know where HHS stood. And 
he said, ‘Larry, you know, those people down 
there in the [Hubert H.] Humphrey Building, 
they’re Republicans. And you know, Larry, I’m a 
Republican, too. Do you think it might make sense 
for you to pick up the phone and find out what 
they think?’ ”
 
Dutifully, he did. During the next months, Atkins 
served as liaison with the Reagan administration 
while Heinz and half a dozen Finance Committee 
members met twice a week in Mitchell’s office 
to work out the bill’s details. Meanwhile, the 
Congressional Budget Office began casting an 
ominous cloud over the process by raising its 
estimates of the bill’s fiscal impact with each 
adjustment.
 
But by October 1987, Bentsen became tired of 
waiting and, according to Atkins, advised Heinz, 
“I’ve held this bill back long enough and we’re 
going to the floor tomorrow morning, with your 
amendment or not. So if you have an amendment, 
come offer it. you’ll be the first amendment up. If 
not, sorry, we’ve given you enough time.” Heinz 
reacted immediately by phoning Joe Wright, 
As the legislative wheels 
began to turn, Heinz chose 
to focus on a significant 
subset of the problem that 
was absent from Bowen’s 
proposal: prescription 
drug costs. According to 
Larry Atkins, Heinz had 
previously considered 
trying to add prescription 
drug coverage to Medicare 
so as to assist those who could stay healthy only by 
taking—and paying out of pocket for—expensive 
medications. Now Heinz had a chance to get 
a prescription drug benefit into the developing 
Medicare catastrophic care bill.
 
Heinz gained soon-to-be Senate Majority Leader 
George Mitchell’s support for the proposal, but 
he faced firm opposition from Senate Finance 
Committee chairman Lloyd Bentsen (D-Texas), 
chief sponsor of the catastrophic illness bill, who 
refused to let the drug benefit be presented as an 
amendment at the committee level. Instead, Heinz 
would have to round up enough votes to pass a 
floor amendment when the bill hit the full Senate. 
Bentsen did not rush the bill forward, giving Heinz 
time to develop his plan.
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There was just one problem: Congress had 
legislated new premiums on all Medicare payors 
for a benefit that would aid only some of them.
 
From a policy perspective, Heinz’s proposal (and 
the catastrophic illness bill in general) looked 
like a prudent application of insurance principles, 
asking everyone to pay a little to share the burden 
that would otherwise fall disproportionately on 
a few. But the program could work only if it was 
mandatory. If it was optional, no one would pay 
the extra premium until he or she began incurring 
large health care costs; adding a preexisting 
condition clause would vitiate the bill’s purpose by 
denying help to those who were uninsured when a 
catastrophe hit them.
 
But 62 percent of Medicare beneficiaries didn’t 
need the help. They already had “medigap” 
insurance, often provided by their employer, that 
fully covered medical and drug costs beyond 
a manageable out-of-pocket limit. The new 
legislation would require them to pay more 
(initially about $120 a year, but potentially 
increasing further in later years) for no new 
benefit.
 
director of the Office of Management and Budget, 
who happened to be one of his tennis partners. 
Heinz’s request was simple: Let us announce that 
we have your support in concept, and we will pledge 
to come back and fix any remaining problems in 
the House-Senate conference. Wright agreed. The 
next day, October 27, Heinz’s amendment was 
approved 88–9 on the Senate floor, after which the 
full catastrophic bill passed 86–11. The House had 
passed a similar bill in July. 
 
The bill bogged down in 
House-Senate conference 
negotiations, partly over 
differences in how to fund 
the prescription drug 
benefit, but eight months 
later, both chambers 
approved the conference 
report and sent it to 
President Reagan, who 
signed it into law on July 
1, 1988. According to the final legislation, coverage 
of all outpatient prescription drugs and insulin 
would begin in 1991, with an initial deductible 
of $600; copayments for charges exceeding the 
deductible would begin at 50 percent but would 
drop to 20 percent beginning in 1993.14  
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provision, but they presumed that the largest 
expansion of Medicare since 1965 would be 
welcomed.” They soon learned otherwise. Once 
higher-income (and generally more politically 
active) seniors came to understand that they were 
being taxed for a benefit they already had, a furor 
broke out, putting legislators on the defensive. 
Efforts to salvage the benefits by altering the 
financing mechanism reached no consensus. 
In November 1989, less than 18 months after 
passing the catastrophic illness bill, Congress, in “a 
retrenchment ... unprecedented in postwar social 
welfare policy,” repealed it.15
 
Fourteen years would elapse between the repeal 
of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act 
of 1988 and the passage of new prescription 
drug legislation in the 2003 act that established 
Medicare Part D, which became effective in 2006. 
Congress did not repeat its 1988 mistake. Instead 
of requiring seniors who already had drug coverage 
to pay for something they did not need, Congress 
created an incentive for beneficiaries to enroll at 
the first opportunity by establishing an age-graded 
premium penalty for seniors who decided to enter 
the program later.  C
Some believe that Heinz, even while he worked 
hard to get a viable prescription drug benefit into 
the Medicare catastrophic care bill, was keenly 
aware of the full bill’s political vulnerabilities. 
Stephen McConnell, who handed Heinz a draft of 
the drug benefit legislation on one of his last days 
as minority staff director, recollected, “I can’t say he 
was overly enthusiastic, in part because of the added 
costs. He always had a sense for what was good 
politics, and he wasn’t sure this passed the test.” 
According to Cliff Shannon, legislative director 
Rich Bryers observed before the bill’s passage, “If 
the Congress enacts it, you’re going to regret it, 
because seniors are going to rebel at the prospect  
of a new tax.”
 
Atkins said that, after the bill became law, Heinz 
asked his staff to prepare a two-page explanation of 
the new benefits and how they would be financed 
for dissemination to Pennsylvania constituents. 
The staff spent several months trying to present 
the provisions in such a way that seniors would 
respond favorably but finally gave up. “Send this to 
Pennsylvanians and your goose is cooked,” Atkins 
recalled telling Heinz.
 
As the 1989 version of the Senate Aging 
Committee’s annual Developments in Aging report 
observed, “At the time of passage, most members 
were aware that some older Americans were 
not pleased with the beneficiary-only financing 
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contact sheet of portraits of heinz speaking on the phone in his office, 1988
 
In six months of investigation, beginning in 
fall 1990, Heinz and his staff (including Lewis) 
uncovered considerable evidence of fraud, 
particularly in the area of durable medical 
equipment. They found sellers claiming $350 of 
Medicare reimbursement for “ulcer pads” that 
were actually egg crate packing material available 
in a standard department store for $29. They 
discovered that, because reimbursement rates 
varied by geographic region, distributors based 
in southern states were obtaining a Philadelphia 
post office box and a phone number with a 215 
area code in order to submit claims for greater 
amounts.
 
With Heinz’s 
approval, staff 
investigators planned 
to set up a fake business 
in order to demonstrate 
how fraud was carried out. 
According to Lewis, the efforts 
would have focused on southern 
states that hold their presidential 
primaries on Super Tuesday.
 
the last investigation 
(1990–91)
In 1989, when Jeff Lewis became John Heinz’s 
last Aging Committee staff director, the senator’s 
priorities were evolving, as illustrated by the fact 
that Lewis’  business card was prominently partisan, 
referring to him as Republican staff director.
 
By this point, Heinz had become chairman of the 
Republican Senate Campaign Committee. Heinz 
still enjoyed excellent relationships across the aisle, 
but he also was significantly engaged in helping 
to elect and reelect Republicans. His actions 
demonstrated that he had become more sensitive 
to the possibility that he might become a viable 
candidate for higher office.
 
Thus, part of Lewis’ job was, as he put it, “to build 
greater name identification beyond Pennsylvania 
and Ohio for a name everyone knew as associated 
with ketchup.” The topic of Medicare fraud and 
abuse was selected as one through which a senator 
with seats on the Aging and Finance Committees 
could make a significant impact and gain national 
prominence.
Chapter 8
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An Aging Committee hearing was scheduled 
for April 5, 1991, with an anonymous witness 
set to give credible evidence of durable medical 
equipment fraud. On April 2, Heinz spent much 
of the day with Andrea Mitchell of NBC Nightly 
News, filming interviews for a feature story on 
Medicare fraud. Lewis then left for Washington, 
D.C., expecting to see Heinz again in Philadelphia 
on April 4.
 
On April 4, the pilot flying Heinz to Philadelphia 
believed that his landing gear was not functioning 
properly. A helicopter was sent up to inspect the 
plane’s nose wheel. But the helicopter moved in 
too close and collided with the plane. Heinz, the 
four pilots of the two aircraft, and two children in 
an elementary school playground who were hit by 
falling debris were killed.
 
The April 5 hearing, the NBC Nightly News story, 
and the planned undercover investigation never 
happened, and a stellar political career that might 
have reached the White House was snuffed out.  C
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October 23, 1938–April 4, 1991
heinz greets a guest at the chapin award dinner in philadelphia, where he received the william chapin award for his work on behalf of the blind and elderly, June 18, 1980.
The Social Security Administration’s periodic 
reviews of the medical status of beneficiaries with 
disabilities are not conducted in the draconian 
style that Heinz exposed and eventually deposed in 
1984. In 2008, only 3.9 percent of the terminations 
of Social Security Disability Insurance were due 
to beneficiaries’ alleged medical improvement, 
and today those who appeal a denial of eligibility 
continue to collect benefits while their appeals  
are reviewed.17
 
Heinz’s success in enacting the pension vesting 
improvements that Jacob Javits had sought became 
one of the first of a series of several significant 
amendments to ERISA. Congress subsequently 
amended ERISA in 1985 to permit employees to 
continue their health care coverage for a period of 
time after leaving a job, in 1996 to restrict employers’ 
ability to deny health care coverage due to preexisting 
conditions, and in 2006 to 
reduce further the vesting 
period for employer 
contributions to 
defined-contribution 
pension plans. The 
maximum time 
needed to become fully 
vested in those plans is 
now three years under cliff 
vesting or six years under a 
graduated plan.
a lasting legacy
John Heinz was a demanding, data-driven, tenacious 
policymaker, distinguished by his compassion for 
aggrieved citizens and his effectiveness in achieving 
passage of legislation. The issues highlighted in this 
case study represent only a few of the many areas in 
which his work has had long-lasting public policy 
impact. Heinz’s considerable substantive policy 
contributions are not the only memorable aspect of 
his legacy, however. He was a personal inspiration to 
many who served under him and who have moved 
on to other influential roles in the last 20 years, and 
some believe that the reasoned, bipartisan legislative 
style in which he specialized is needed today more 
than ever.16
SUBSTANTIVE IMPACT
Heinz drove virtually the last nail into the coffin 
of mandatory retirement laws, and he was 15 
years ahead of his time in seeking to include a 
prescription drug benefit within Medicare. In  
other areas, his legislative achievements pointed  
the way to further policy change or are still 
recognized as landmarks.
 
Chapter 9
heinz greets a guest at the chapin award dinner in philadelphia, where he received the william chapin award for his work on behalf of the blind and elderly, June 18, 1980.
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THE LOST STyLE: BIPARTISANSHIP 
AND PERSUASION
Stylistically, Heinz’s approach to policymaking 
is greatly revered by those who remember him, 
though some question whether he could have 
maintained his legislative effectiveness at such a 
high level amidst today’s environment of increased 
polarization, both in the media and on Capitol Hill. 
 
Jeff Lewis believed that the Senate Finance 
Committee became more hamstrung by partisan 
deadlocks almost immediately after Heinz’s death. 
Remembering a tie vote on a provision related 
to children’s health, Lewis stated, “Heinz would 
have gone to [Democratic Senator Daniel Patrick] 
Moynihan and said ‘We have to figure out a way to 
help these kids.’ ”
 
Frank McArdle, who still works in Washington, 
D.C., also bemoans the change. Twenty-five years 
ago, he said, “There was an underlying willingness 
that, despite all the partisan differences and 
positioning, in the end, members of Congress would 
sit down and reach a compromise that both sides 
could live with and do the right thing. That sense of 
compromise is now, alas, very elusive.”
Heinz’s attempts to raise the quality of care 
in nursing homes, which seemed stalled by 
bureaucracy when he died, eventually bore rich 
fruit. Even though the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services did not complete 
its promulgation of final regulations to enforce 
the 1987 law until eight years later, a 1996 study 
found dramatic improvements that its author 
attributed to the 1987 reforms. For example, 
families and residents were significantly more 
involved in decisions regarding patient care, the use 
of psychotropic drugs had been reduced by about 
one-third, and the use of restraints on patients had 
decreased by 50 percent.18 Even in 2011, a New 
York Times feature article on innovative efforts  
to deinstitutionalize nursing care pointed back  
to Heinz’s legislation as the original impetus:  
“The movement has its roots in the 1987 Nursing 
Home Reform Act, which declared that residents 
of long-term care have the right to be free from 
abuse or neglect.”19
 
Given Heinz’s commitment to policy battles, it is 
most unfortunate that he and his investigative staff 
never had the chance to implement their bold plans 
to uncover Medicare fraud and abuse. Twenty years 
later, that problem continues to plague the country; 
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
estimated that the total cost of improper Medicare 
payments in calendar year 2009 was $24.1 billion.
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A PERSONAL TOUCH
Rother, Stephen McConnell, and Larry Atkins 
concluded their memoir with the following 
reminiscences, which deserve to be the final words 
of this case study as well:
 
  Senator Heinz’s legacy through the Aging 
Committee was more than his impressive 
policy and legislative achievements, though. 
His high standards of excellence for the work 
that was done, his strong commitment to well-
considered policy, and his sensitivity to the 
human impact of the work of the Congress all 
had a lasting effect on the people who were 
privileged to work for him as staff on the 
Committee. Most of his staff have moved on 
to take his work ethic and high standards into 
influential positions in the aging and health 
policy community in Washington and across 
the country. His Aging staff today have lead 
roles in major aging organizations like AARP 
and the Alzheimer’s Association, in policy think 
tanks like the Kaiser Family Foundation and 
for-profit consulting firms, and in corporations.  
 
Cliff Shannon summarized the essence of Heinz’s 
approach as trying to work with colleagues on both 
sides of the aisle, experts, and constituents and to 
reach solutions through persuasion and compromise. 
“He really did believe,” Shannon stated, “that politics 
at its highest form was persuasion. I think that is a 
forgotten art these days.”
  
Several of Heinz’s former 
staffers wonder if he 
would have remained a 
Republican as party lines 
hardened and the number 
of moderates left in the 
middle dwindled. McArdle 
theorized that, if still in the 
Senate today, Heinz “would 
be one of the few left 
standing who would still 
use bipartisan negotiations to increase their leverage 
on an issue.” John Rother speculated, “I don’t think 
he would have been a Democrat, but he might have 
become an Independent to have more freedom of 
action.” But Shannon, who was more involved with 
Heinz’s partisan activities than were most of the 
Aging Committee staff, expressed a different view: 
“He would not have changed parties—he would 
have changed the Republican Party.”
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  For many of us, the experience reaffirmed our 
faith in democracy. Here was a gifted and 
privileged man who could have done almost 
anything else. What he chose to do was to serve 
the public good. He believed in government 
and the power of government to make people’s 
lives better. He believed it was possible to 
determine the right thing to do and to do it, 
and he lived his beliefs. His pushed himself as 
hard as he pushed us.
  It is easy to become cynical over the course of a 
career in Washington. Our personal antidote to 
cynicism is to remember how much John Heinz 
cared about our country and its potential, and 
how much of himself he was willing to give to 
help it realize that potential.  C
  All of us owe a debt to the Senator for the 
opportunity to work for him and the education 
we all gained in policy and how to shape it. It 
was a tough education. He tested the mettle of 
every staff person who worked for him, like an 
old-time bartender who has to bite each coin 
to check if it’s real. Those who were confident 
in their command of their field and who could 
stand up to him when he challenged them did 
well. Those who wilted under pressure were 
gone. Many a staff earned their stripes by being 
“Heinzed.”  
  But the value of a Heinz education did not go 
unnoticed. When a number of us were gathered 
to mourn the Senator’s death, one former Aging 
Committee staffer from the other side of the 
aisle observed how envious other Committee 
staff were of those who worked for Heinz. “We 
always felt,” he said, “that you Heinz staff came 
away from your time with him knowing more 
than anyone else on the Hill about your specialty. 
He had such a tremendous grasp of the issues 
that you had to really know your stuff to keep up 
with him.” He was demanding, but it was that 
uncompromising quality that drove excellence 
on his staff.  
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“ Working together, we can lay the groundwork  
for a society that respects age and the elderly  
and that truly realizes the benefits of the experience, 
wisdom, and judgment of older Americans.” 
 
– John Heinz, May 10, 1983
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